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How Much Did Speculation Contribute to Recent Food Price Inflation? 




Recent increases in commodity prices have led to calls for the regulation of speculators.  These 
calls have come from many reputable quarters including leading agricultural and food policy 
institutions such as International Food Policy Research Institute as well as different members of 
the U.S. Congress.  They are based on an assumption that speculative activities are a primary or 
major source of the volatility in the markets and that controlling these activities through 
regulations would bring more stability to the market.  The paper tests this hypothesis and 
assesses the contribution of speculative activities in the commodity markets over the past decade 
to price inflation. The paper argues that government regulatory policies to control speculation in 
commodity markets is a second best solution that would probably yield neutral or negative 
benefits to the very people the policy aims to protect. 
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 Introduction 
Recent increases in food prices engendered panic in many policy circles around the world 
as many government officials and interested academics and policy wonks searched for culprits 
and perpetrators of these increases.  The World Bank, for example, notes on its website that 
“High fuel costs have resulted in higher agriculture costs, falling food stocks, and land shifted 
out of food production to produce biofuels.”  Similarly, the Indian Finance Minister, Mr. P. 
Chidambaram, while addressing the Development Committee of World Bank and IMF in 
Washington on April 13, 2008, argued that high crude oil and galloping food prices were 
imposing a crushing burden on developing countries.  The Minister blamed rising food prices on 
diversion of food crops for biofuels.  The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) notes in its 
Food Outlook that total global food imports will surge above $1,000 billion for the first time in 
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 2008, up about 20 per cent from 2007 level. “Food,” the FAO Food Outlook concludes, “is no 
longer the cheap commodity that it once was.”   The estimates are that wheat and rice prices are 
up 120 percent and 75% respectively.  The effect of these increases on the world’s poor is 
significant because they spend the majority of their incomes on food and even slight increases in 
prices can have devastating impacts on their welfare.  Thus, these projections of shifts in the 
trajectories of global food prices and demand and supply conditions have important strategic 
implications for all stakeholders in the agri-food supply chain as well as governments and public 
policy makers.  Finally, there were some who believed that speculators were responsible for the 
rising food prices and, therefore, new policies must be developed and implemented to control 
speculative behavior in the market.  For example, a May 2008 paper by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) identified eight initiatives to address the rising commodity 
prices, and while acknowledging that speculation is not the cause of the problem but its 
consequence, proceeded to recommend a need for policies that “calm markets with the use of 
market-oriented regulation of speculation . . .” 
This short research paper seeks to determine the extent to which speculation may explain 
the rising commodity prices that occurred between late 2006 and mid 2008.  In doing this, the 
paper defines speculation as the proportion of open interest in the commodity futures market that 
is accounted for by non-commercial traders.  This will provide the level of speculation activity in 
the commodity futures and options markets at any period by looking at the proportion of open 
contracts that the buyers or the sellers had no intention of delivering or taking delivery of.  For 
these non-registered traders, their whole purpose of participating in the market is to make money 
on the spread and not in acquiring physical assets for trade.   
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 The paper argues that speculator actions can increase volatility in markets by removing 
and introducing products from and into the market in ways that enhance their probability of 
increasing their spreads and, hence, their potential profits.  But the futures price, which is what 
the speculator seeks to move, is different, even if it is correlated with the spot market price for 
commodities. On the other hand, the food price increases that occurred involved prices that 
consumers were paying on the spot market, and not the futures market. 
The Model 
 
The data used in the study is a time series data and hence the first thing we wanted to do 
was to determine if the characteristics of a time series – the mean and variance – are constant 
over time? If the mean and variance are constant over time, then the series is stationary. If the 
mean and variance change, then the series is nonstationary. We used the Dickey Fuller test and 
Phillips-Perron test to test for the hypothesis of  unit root tests in the price and proportion of 
speculators in the markets.  
We use a simple OLS model as well as an ARIMA (Auto Regressive Integrated Moving 
Average), model for the study. The application of the ARIMA methodology for the study of time 
series analysis is attributed  to Box and Jenkins and Reinsel ( 1994). ARIMA models have been 
already applied to forecast commodity prices (Weiss, 2000; Chinn, LeBlanc, and Coibion, 
2001). A major difference between regression and ARIMA in terms of application is that 
regression deals with autocorrelation either in the error term by eliminating or factoring out such 
autocorrelation before estimates of relationships are made, whereas ARIMA models attempt to 
build in such autocorrelation -- where it exists - in the modeling process itself ( Veney,J. and  
Luckey,1983). The ARIMA model uses a combination of autoregressive and moving average 
specification. A series with a moving average component is one where each observation is a 
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 function of the current random shock plus some portion of the previous random shock(s). A 
series with an autoregressive component is one in which each observation is a function of the 
random shock, plus some fraction of the previous observation(s). We have included two lags in 
both the AR and MA and used the first differenced prices regressed against the explanatory 
variable of the first differenced proportion of speculators.  
Results 
Unit root tests  
The Dickey Fuller test and Phillips-Perron test for unit root tests indicated that all the 
three price variables do have unit root at 1% significance level, implying that they are not 
stationary. So we first differenced the price variables to make these variables stationary. The 
same tests for the proportion of the speculators in corn, wheat and soybean markets also 
indicated that the hypothesis of unit root test is not rejected at the 5 % significance level. For this 
reason we also first differenced these speculation variables to make them stationary. 
We regressed the first differenced value of the corn, wheat and soybean prices against 
their respective first differenced proportion of speculators. Results are shown in Table 1. One of 
the problems in a time series data is autocorrelation. To detect the presence of autocorrelation, 
we run the Ljung Box Q-test described as a white noise process and Durbin Watson test. For 
corn, wheat, and soybean markets, only the DW test indicated that there is autocorrelation 
present. We also run the Q-test to detect if there is autocorrelation present. For corn and soybean 
markets the Q test indicated that there is no autocorrelation detected, while for wheat both tests 
revealed that there are no autocorrelation problems. These results suggest that only for wheat, 
using ARIMA might be a good estimation. For corn and soybean, using ARIMA did not get rid 
of the presence of the autocorrelation and hence the choice might not seem justified. 
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 The estimated coefficients for the explanatory variable of speculators in wheat and 
soybean markets are not significant when both OLS and ARIMA models are used. Where as for 
corn market, both models showed that the speculators coefficient are significant at 5 % 
significance level. Regardless of which market and significance, all the signs of the coefficients 
for the speculators were negatively related with the each of the prices.  
The R square results for the OLS models are less than 0.05. Including the lagged prices in 
each model slightly increases the R-squares for wheat and substantially for the corn and soybean 
market. For this reason, we run all the above regressions by including the respective lagged 
prices. For corn and wheat, only the D-W test indicated the presence of autocorrelation, for 
soybean both The Q-test and D-W test revealed the presence of autocorrelation. We have also 
run the ARIMA models for each of the previous OLS counterparts with two lags for both the AR 
and MA. Results are shown in Table 2. Only in the soybean market that the Q-test and D-W tests 
indicated that there is no autocorrelation. 
When the price lags were included in the explanatory variables, in both the OLS and 
ARIMA specifications, the coefficients of the speculators are not statistically significant in all 
the corn, wheat and soybean markets.  However, the prices lags were found out to be statistically 
significant at 1 % significance level in explaining the price movement in the corn market, and 
only significant at 1 % significance level in the wheat market in the ARIMA model only , and at 
5 % significance level in the soybean market when OLS was used.  
Conclusion 
In this paper we attempted to assess the contribution of speculative activities in the 
commodity markets over the past decade to price inflation. Specifically, the paper sought to 
determine the extent to which speculative activities in principal commodity markets contributed 
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 to the price inflation observed in past decade.  Arguing that government regulatory policies to 
control speculation in commodity markets is a second best solution that would probably yield 
neutral or negative benefits to the very people the policy aims to protect, it suggests that 
speculators should be left to the regulatory controls of the market by enforcing trading rules, 
prosecuting rule breakers with existing laws and improving transparency of trading activities. 
The non-significance of the estimated coefficients in both the OLS and ARIMA models seems to 
support this notion. The paper calls for careful appreciation of market conditions that require 
interventions and counsels that such interventions be undertaken with caution if unintended 
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 Table 1.Results of OLS and ARIMA models when the explanatory variable is only the 












































Table2.Results of OLS and ARIMA models when the explanatory variable is only the 












































Note: *, **, and *** represents significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
 
 
 